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INTEGRATING THEATER ARMY STRATEGIC, THEATER/TACTICAL, AND SUSTAINING BASE
SIGNAL SUPPORT UNDER ONE COMMAND

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Alfred A. Schenck
United States Army

Colonel Robert F. Hervey
Project Adviser

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ABSTRACT

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The mission of military communications is to facilitate the execution of command, control, and supporting functions. To be responsive to this mission, reliable systems must be provided which will permit the rapid and secure interchange of information throughout the chain of command. There must be an unbroken chain of communications extending from the President to the Secretary of Defense, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the commanders of the unified and specified (combatant) commands, to commanders of assigned service components, and thence to other subordinate commanders.(1)

The paragraph above states the basic doctrine for communications support, as espoused in JCS Pub 2 and quoted in FM

11-23, Theater Army Communications Command, dated 1972. Though somewhat dated, its premise for the focus of communication support to the combatant commander is still very much correct. The unbroken chain of communications from the President.....to commanders of assigned service components and thence to other subordinate commanders is available today in Southwest Asia, and to every operational theater supported by U.S. forces. While the requirement can be simply stated and understood, the task of providing rapid, secure, and continuous command and control communications requires the efforts of many diverse signal elements. These signal elements represent each major echelon within the theater army area. They are individually commanded, and have primary missions that focus on the the independent operations of their supported units. Despite the appearance of autonomy in their support missions, the technical capabilities of

their equipments and the professional dedication and expertise of the soldiers and their leaders makes possible the integration of the tactical and strategic communications within the theater.

Thesis

Although the current command and control communications capability provided to theater army commanders must be acknowledged as the finest in the history of warfighting, it requires the full integration of the strategic and tactical communications systems available within the theater army area. The signal organizations tasked with providing this capability are unparalleled in their training and readiness, however their individual organizational structures, which tend to focus on their ability to operate independent of other signal organizations, often hinders their ability to perform in a collective effort and provide the doctrinally required communications. To ensure that the tremendous communications capability and expertise within the theater is readily available at every echelon, we must integrate the theater army strategic and all tactical communications under one command.

Research Methodology and Sources

The research methods selected for this paper are in consonance with those recommended in the U.S. Army War College guidebook, Research and Style Manual. Carlisle Barracks: AY 1991.

Initial research required a detailed analysis of current and emerging doctrine related to theater army level communications requirements and organizations. Typical signal organizations were analyzed to ascertain their ability to provide the doctrinally required communications, as well as the actual or operational communications required by the supported command. Discussions with former signal and combat unit commanders, and officers having served on division, corps, or theatre army staffs provided a unique opportunity to capture first hand experiences of those involved with signal organizations at all levels. Informal conversations with selected, senior leaders within the signal community provided a historic reference.

Chapter 2

DOCTRINAL REQUIREMENTS

Prior to discussing the doctrine, organization, and mission of the signal units found within a theater army, it is necessary to provide the framework under which the signal units are required.

THEATER ARMY

The theater army (TA) is normally the army component element of a unified combatant command. The Eighth U.S. Army and the U.S. Army, Europe are two such examples.(2) The armies receive guidance from the commander-in-chief (CINC) of the combatant command. They function either as an operational or support command, or both. As an operational command, the TA may direct

the activities of several corps size units and other special mission units, as assigned. As a support organization, the TA manages the sustainment functions required by all army units within its area of responsibility by providing personnel, fuel, ammunition, maintenance, transportation, and security.(3) To perform the myriad of tasks associated with each function, the TA commander requires a level of command and control communications support that ensures the rapid, reliable, and secure transfer of critical information throughout the theater and the sustaining base. The quality of decisions made by the TA commander will be directly proportional to the quality and timeliness of the information upon which his decisions are based. The TA communications system provides the means of delivering this information to the TA commander. The system must permit maximum command flexibility; provide adequate traffic handling capacity,

to include accomodating critical real-time CSS data transfers, rear area protection information exchange, intelligence and weather traffic support; and ensure survivability.(4)

Communications must be provided from the theater to CONUS. Maximum use of in-theater communications will be accomplished to the extent possible to support wartime requirements. The system must be capable of being expanded and reconfigured with tactical, transportable equipment to support the changing geographic areas and unit densities.(5)

To be useful in wartime, the communications system must be survivable and capable of sustained operation in a high-stress environment. The communications system must have multiple means and alternate routing capabilities, and provide protection from physical damage and electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The equipment must be capable of being rapidly relocated to reduce

targetability, and the system must have multiple nodes with geographic dispersion of communications equipment within each node.(6)

Finally, the communications system must be capable of being tailored to meet the support and operational requirements of both forward deployed and nonforward deployed U.S. Army forces.

CORPS

The corps is the largest, tactical, maneuver element in the Army.(7) The corps is normally assigned to a TA, however it may operate independently or as the land component of a joint task force. Through the corps the TA commander conducts operational maneuver and carries out his assigned missions. Because of the complexities within each theater, as mentioned earlier, the corps must be tailored to the theater and the assigned mission. However

once tailored, they contain all the organic combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) required to conduct operations for a considerable period.(8) However the corps' ability to operate independent of a joint or theater headquarters requires a communications organization that can operate autonomously and effectively while having the capability to interface technically with a higher command if required. The corps is unique in this respect since it is the interface point between higher commands and other tactical units. Because of the anticipated focus by the enemy on command and control communications systems, the corps requires three secure communications means to ensure the continuous flow of critical information.(9)

The first means is an area common user system for the transmission of voice, data, and hard copy information throughout the corps area and to higher commands. It provides an

interlocking network that allows information exchange between all subscribers within the corps area.(10) Subscribers to the network are provided telephones, facsimile, and data terminal devices to allow them access to the network. A limited number of users also have mobile access to the system. The devices are user owned, installed, and operated. The network is composed of a series of communications nodes that when deployed form a grid, thereby ensuring redundancy, reliability, and survivability of service.(11)

Secondly, the corps requires a secure data distribution system network for handling selected data information. The data distribution network provides critical target acquisition, position and navigation, and unit and personnel identification information to the corps commander and his staff.(12)

The combat net radio completes the triad of communications means available within the corps, and provides the primary mobile capability for a majority of users. The combat net radio consists of both frequency modulated (FM) and high frequency (HF) single-channel radios.(13) The secure FM radios provide a short range capability, primarily to subordinate commands, while the HF radios provide a greatly extended range capability and supplement the area common user system. Both possess the capability to interface with the area common user system.

DIVISION

The division is the largest Army fixed organization that trains and fights as a tactical team. It is organized with varying numbers and types of combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units. A division may be armored, mechanized, motorized, infantry, light infantry, airborne, or air

assault. It is a self-sustaining force capable of independent operations, even for long periods of time, when properly reinforced. Each type of division conducts tactical operations in a low, middle, or high intensity combat environment. Divisions are the basic units of maneuver at the tactical level.(14)

Divisions tailor their own brigades and attached forces for specific missions.(15) This includes the incorporation of CS and CSS elements as well. Communications support for the division requires collective and integrated application of communication services and systems.(16) This includes communications, automation, publications and printing, visual information, and records management. The division also requires the three communications means, previously identified for the corps, to facilitate its rapid and continuous transfer of command and control information. User doctrine specifies that the division signal battalion will provide motor messenger and/or air messenger service to the major subordinate command posts.(17)

The division communications system must provide common user and dedicated circuits for support of units in the division area, and be responsive to changes in the divisions organization for combat or relocation of units. The system must be capable of interfacing with corps, joint, and allied communications systems.(18)

Specifically, the division signal organization must install, operate, and maintain a division communications system for support of division level combat functions including command and control, intelligence, fire control, CS, and CSS.(19) It will provide internal communications at all echelons of the division headquarters to include the division main, rear, and tactical (TAC) CPs, and the division support area. Finally, the signal

organization must provide special staff and technical assistance for the planning and control of all division communications required by the division commander and his staff.(20)

If there appears to be a disparity in the signal support requirements for each echelon within the theater, the appearance is correct. For example, in theater army doctrine, the use of host nation and contingency communications support, and the use of signal air and ground messengers is discussed. The corps manual doesn't include either of these requirements but does specify the need for three distinct communications means. The division manual restates the need for signal air and ground messengers, in delineating its communications requirements, but then proceeds to discuss all five disciplines under the information mission area which includes communications. It is of interest that the documents were written within five years of each other, and that all are from the same source. The disparity is due in part to the

users traditional, autonomous, echelon approach in assessing signal support requirements. In chapter three, we will see how the U.S. Army Signal Center, the proponent for signal doctrine, responds to the users requirements.

Chapter 3

SIGNAL SUPPORT at THEATER ARMY and ECHELONS CORPS and BELOW

Signal support is the implementation of the Information Mission Area (IMA) at the operational through tactical levels of war.(21) The IMA is composed of the following disciplines:

- Communications
- Automation
- Visual information
- Records management
- Printing and publications

The inclusion of these five disciplines under the signal support umbrella reflects an acknowledgement of their roles in the

information area and the growing dependence that all of them place on communications and automation. The modernization efforts of the U.S. Army are providing the theater army commander with the communications and automation equipment that will allow him the rapid and continuous transfer of information to support his command and control requirements. The responsibility, whether direct or supervisory, for the installation and operation of this equipment rests with the signal organizations organic to each major echelon within the theater army. A discussion of each signal organization and its basic missions follows. The organizational structure and missions provided here reflect the doctrine promulgated by the U.S. Army Signal Center, the proponent for signal support in the Army.

Theater Signal Command (Army)

The basic mission of the Theater Signal Command (Army) (TSC(A)), is to provide the Information Management System to support the theater army and its forces, including special operations forces. It also provides the organization and equipment to interface with, extend, and restore the army portion of the Defense Communications System (DCS) in the theater. It provides gateways into joint, strategic, and sustaining base networks as needed. When directed, the TSC(A) provides telecommunication support for unified or combined joint force commanders.(22) Additionally the TSC(A) manages and operates the theater army reproduction and combat camera systems. Each TSC(A) is tailored to satisfy the command and control requirements of the supported theater army commander. The tailoring process must consider the mission, force size, geographic area, resources, survivability, support agreements with allied forces, and the

availability of host nation signal systems. The TSC(A) provides command and control for two or more theater signal brigades and may contain separate battalions, companies or detachments.(23)

The TSC(A) commander also serves as the theater signal officer (TSO), and in this capacity performs all the signal planning and coordination for the theater. An example of a TSC(A) is shown at Figure 3-1.(24) The theater signal brigades may function as a part of a TSC(A) or as the highest signal unit in a theater.(25)

The brigade is normally tailored to perform a given mission, which allows a flexible response to different force scenarios.(26) The tailoring is made possible through the command and control of battalions and separate companies or detachments that are organized independently by a table of organization and equipment (TOE) to perform a specific mission. An example of a theater signal brigade is shown at Figure 3-2.(27)




Figure 3-1. Theater Signal Command (Army).




Figure 3-2. Theater signal brigade.

Corps Signal Brigade

The corps signal brigade has as its basic mission the installation, operation, and maintenance of an area communications system in support of the corps. The brigade also provides telecommunications support to all subordinate commands and corps command posts. The corps area common user system provides at least two entry points into the theater army area via the TSC(A) area network. These gateways are deployed independent of the physical boundaries between units. (28) The corps signal brigade consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, three area signal battalions and one support signal battalion. A typical corps signal brigade is shown at Figure 3-3.(29) Additionally the corps signal brigade manages the corps wide area network, and provides technical direction over that portion of the corps network installed by the division's signal battalions. The signal brigade commander also serves as the corps signal officer (CSO).




Figure 3-3. Corps signal brigade.

In this capacity, he is responsible for the planning and coordination for all corps signal support. He performs this mission through his assistant corps signal office (ACSO), located with the corps staff.

Division Signal Battalion

The mission of the division signal battalion is to install, operate, and maintain telecommunications systems for the division. The battalion installs, operates, and maintains the division Area Common User system, and provides other IMA services as required.(30) It also provides a portion of the corps integrated area networks. The division signal battalion consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, two area signal companies, and one signal support company. The battalion is organic to all five types of divisions identified in chapter two. A typical division signal battalion is shown at Figure 3-4.(31)




Figure 3-4. Division signal battalion.

Additionally the battalion manages the divisions wide area network, and provides technical direction of that portion of the division network provided by subordinate units. The division signal battalion commander also serves as the division signal officer (DSO), and is responsible for the planning and coordination for all signal support in the division. He performs this mission through his assistant division signal office (ADSO), which is identified as a special staff element to the division commander.

Embedded in the basic mission statements for each signal organization are missions that are common to all. These missions include both signal staff and unit responsibilities. The signal officer is responsible for all support functions while the unit commander is responsible for the actual installation of the force

commanders IMA systems networks. A list of those missions common to all signal organizations within the theater army is included below:

Signal Staff Responsibilities-

- 0 Manage signal support network for force commander.
- 0 Provide staff supervision of information systems.
- 0 Provide staff supervision of functional and battlefield information systems.
- 0 Perform duties as central POC for printing and privacy act/freedom of information act requests.
- 0 Provide staff supervision over internal distribution.
- 0 Ensure that messenger service is provided with augmentation by supported units.(32)

Signal Unit Responsibilities-

- 0 Plan, install, operate, and maintain wide-area communications networks.
- 0 Terminate army strategic telecommunications networks.
- 0 Operate communications system control facilities.
- 0 Provide messenger service (augmented by user).(33)

If we crosswalk the user requirements from chapter 2 and those identified by the signal community in this chapter, we acknowledge that the division through theater signal requirements can be accomplished by the organizations discussed here. However the signal doctrine mentioned here also mirrors the autonomous, echelon approach followed by the users, and in so doing renders it at odds with its intended purpose. Signal support under IMA can not be executed exclusively by echelon. The five disciplines,

especially automation and communications, must be integrated throughout the theater if they are to be accomplished efficiently. We can not have each echelon within a theater army area of operations performing spectrum, comsec, or network management independently. This not only creates compatibility problems for the user, but more importantly it creates problems in the training of signal leaders, and often puts them at odds with the supported command. For example, FM 71-100, Division Operations, states that the signal battalion will provide air/ground messenger service. FM 11-50, Combat Communications Within The Division, does not acknowledge this service. FM 24-1, Signal Support in The Airland Battle, states that the signal unit will provide messenger service when augmented by the user. Obviously they are both right; or are they? Of the three signal manuals reviewed, only FM 11-23, Signal Support Responsibilities: Echelons Above Corps (EAC), directly responds to the requirements for signal support as stated by the user. It also discusses the

IMA directly as a requirement, as does FM 11-50 while the corps manual, dated 1978, doesn't address it at all. A doctrinal update for signal support for echelons corps and below is forthcoming and will address the IMA requirements. This review is purely from a point of doctrinal sufficiency however, and does not necessarily reflect either the actual operational requirements of the users or the actual signal support provided for a given theater. The review does not address inherent problems in the scheduling of revisions and release of doctrine, nor does it discuss the importance of "emerging" doctrine as an interim source of guidance.

As mentioned earlier, the signal organizations within the theater can either be tailored organizationally or augmented with additional equipment to effectively satisfy the theater commander's requirements. An example of a TSC(A) tailored for a specific theater is shown at Figure 3-5. This TSC(A) is located

**SIGNAL COMPONENT
STRATEGIC
THEATER/TACTICAL
SUSTAINING BASE**

COMMAND AND CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AUTOMATION, PRINTING AND PUBLICATIONS, RECORDS MANAGEMENT, VISUAL INFORMATION




Figure 3-5. Theater Signal Command (Army)

in the European theater and provides signal support from theater army/tactical level through the strategic and sustaining base.(34) While the basic structure closely mirrors the doctrinal organization in Figure 3-1, the operational requirements of the theater have caused the addition of two battalions, a separate company, and sustaining base elements to increase the capabilities of the command.

This TSC(A) provides theater tactical communications to the combatant command headquarters, the theater army, two or more corps, and strategic communications support to every military community (MILCOM) in the theater. Garrison support includes the installation, operation, and maintenance of telephone service, message centers, data processing, visual information, and printing and publication.

The garrison signal support to each MILCOM ensures that there is a TSC(A) presence within the operational area of the corps and division. While this does not directly compete with the tactical missions of the organic signal units, it does provide a potentially cumbersome division of labor, since the organic signal units at corps and division echelons must train to provide those same services during field exercises and war. Cumbersome in that the combat commanders within selected MILCOMs must currently look to two, separate signal organizations to effectively satisfy their signal requirements. This should not exist. Combat commanders should have only one point of contact for signal support, whether in garrison or during war. This is already true for many of the other combat and combat service support functions. As one senior leader within the signal corps commented, "The commander only needs one guy to handle his DOIM (Directorate of Information Management) and tactical concerns." (35) His sentiments are echoed loudly (but off-the-record) by many within the Signal Corps. The

concern is that while the two signal officers are compelled to maintain the division of labor due to doctrine or organization, each must be prepared to respond professionally, expertly, and individually on the status or any other aspect of the total IMA to the MILCOM commander. The opportunity for signal officer "finger pointing" becomes highly probable, not from a lack of professionalism or expertise but, because it will be extremely difficult to maintain a current assessment of services or capabilities available when the mission is not yours. However if the theater level is established as the focus for signal support, we could fully embrace all the disciplines of IMA, to include community and tactical communications, under one command. We could promulgate one doctrinal offering that would provide a basis for the professional development and training of our officers and senior noncommissioned officers, irregardless of their assignment within the theater. Their assignments could be monitored by the theater signal commander and not by the supported major

commands (MACOM). This would ensure a more equitable distribution of signal expertise across all environments and, through reassignments, enhance the professional development of all signal leaders within the theater. The current system for moving corps and division signal officers and senior NCOs within the theater requires approval from the local and MACOM combat commanders, whose decisions are too often based on the availability of a replacement rather than the professional needs of the signal leader.

Many of the concerns mentioned in the previous paragraph have been and could continue to be controlled by regulations and local procedures. However the best solution may be to place the total responsibility for the theater army strategic and tactical signal support under one command.

Chapter 4

PROPOSED THEATER SIGNAL COMMAND (ARMY)

Many of you by now are repeating the old adage that "if it ain't broke, don't fix it". Normally I would agree, and the fact remains that the current structure is working and could likely be in place for some time. However it is also a fact that the current theater army signal support structure has evolved slowly over a period of more than forty years. As the army looks ahead to significant reductions in the total force and explores concepts of force projection and forced entry, we must ensure that the signal support structure continues to evolve with those concepts in mind.

The concept of force projection, or the ability to quickly deploy forces from CONUS or any other strategic location and establish an American presence in one of five theaters around the world, focuses on the theater level for combat operations. Our support to the theater army commander must now focus on the total integration of theater level signal support.

The TSC(A), shown at Figure 4-1, is a proposed organizational structure that could provide a maximum signal support capability to the theater army while significantly streamlining responsibilities at each level of command. The command is basically a hybrid organization in that it begins with the TSC(A) shown in Figure 3-5 and incorporates the signal units at echelons, corps and below, (ECB) under the TSC(A) headquarters. This effectively places all three levels of signal support (strategic, theater/tactical, and sustaining base) under one command. In this proposal, the command is tailored with three tactical and two




Figure 4-1. Proposed Theater Signal Command (Army)

sustaining base brigades. The two corps support brigades have a base organization of area battalions and one support battalion each. One of the area battalions will be under the operational control of each division. The sustaining base brigades will additionally support the strategic or Defense Communications System mission. The TSC(A) commander will be the configuration manager and have operational control for all IMA system architectures within the theater. The TSC(A) commander will also serve as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management (DCSIM), with the peacetime rank of major general, to appropriately serve with other members of the theater army staff. The deputy TSC(A) commander will be a brigadier general.

The senior signal commander of a battalion size unit or larger, whether sustaining or tactical will be responsible for all IMA functions within its MILCOM. This will eliminate the need for dual responsibility between signal commanders and ensure that the

MILCOM/combat commander need only address his signal support concerns to one signal element. An example of this dual responsibility occurs when a division commander is provided tactical signal support by the division signal battalion commander, located in his MILCOM, while being provided garrison telephone service by a sustaining base commander located in another MILCOM.

The TSC(A) commander will be responsible for the assignment of all signal officers and senior NCOs entering the theater. He will be responsible for all mission and professional development training required to ensure signal leaders are knowledgeable in all their responsibilities under the IMA.

Corps and division commanders will have operational control of those signal elements in direct support of their commands. Normally a brigade size unit will be dedicated to a corps and a

battalion size unit for a division. However, units will be tailored by the TSC(A) commander to support planned and contingency training requirements and to meet specific operational mission scenarios, as required. A signal support element will be assigned permanently to the corps and division staffs for planning and daily management of IMA support services. The senior division signal officer will be rated by the corps signal brigade commander and senior rated by the division commander. The corps signal brigade commander will be rated by the TSC(A) commander and senior rated by the corps commander. This is in response to the concern that the combat commanders would not have a mechanism for providing guidance, leadership, and feedback on the signal support provided by our signal officers.

Theater army MACOMs will justify their requirements for all IMA support in their annual budgets. This includes all operation, maintenance, and training resources associated with signal support

units in direct support of their commands. Additionally MACOMs will provide projected training requirements to the TSC(A), to allow integration with the TSC(A) annual training guidance.

Because of the comprehensive structure, missions and training requirements associated with the proposed TSC(A), all elements of the command must be afforded COMPO 1 status.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

After an evaluation of the facts and considerations posed in the preceeding paragraphs, specifically chapters 3 and 4, the following conclusions are provided:

0 The current doctrinal offerings for signal support do not fully embrace the disciplines of IMA and continue to accentuate autonomy in providing signal support at each echelon. There must be one common doctrinal philosophy for IMA support that links all echelons.

0 By focusing on signal support from the theater army perspective, professional development training for signal officers and senior noncommissioned officers can be developed and conducted to better support the full complement of responsibilities under the IMA.

0 Acceptance of the proposed TSC(A) would allow the management of all theater signal officers to be under one MACOM, thus simplifying the movement of officers for career development.

0 By integrating the strategic, theater/tactical, and sustaining base signal support under one command, supported commanders will have a single point of contact for all IMA support.

0 To ensure that the proposed TSC(A) is adequately resourced for training, sustainment, and modernization, supported MACOMs

must justify their IMA requirements in their annual budgets, and acknowledge unresourced requirements as unavailable support.

0 Acceptance of the proposed TSC(A) would make available the wealth of technical expertise that exists at theater army level to all echelons through individual and collective training, and technical assistance.

0 Because of the critical need to train and deploy as a total entity, no TSC or portion thereof should be assigned to the reserve or national guard component.

0 The potential for reductions in resources as a result of the proposed TSC(A) is apparent and should be considered.

Recommendations

0 Recommend that a follow-on study be conducted to determine the full implications of integrating the three signal components under one command.

0 Recommend that the signal doctrine community consider the proposal for the total integration of theater signal support.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 11-23, p. 2-1 (hereafter referred to as "FM 11-23").
2. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, p. 186 (hereafter referred to as "FM 100-5").
3. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-6, p. 6-2 (hereafter referred to as "FM 100-6").
4. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-16, p. 4-1 (hereafter referred to as "FM 100-16").
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 1-0.
8. FM 100-5, p. 185.
9. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-15, p. 4-5 (hereafter referred to as "FM 100-15").
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-100, p. 1 (hereafter referred to as "FM 71-100").
15. FM 100-5, p. 185.
16. FM 71-100, p. 2-11.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.

21. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 24-1, p. 1-1 (hereafter referred to as "FM 24-1").
22. FM 11-23, p. 4-130.
23. FM 24-1., p. 3-4.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 3-5.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 3-6.
29. Ibid.
30. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 11-50, p. 2-1 (hereafter referred to as "FM 11-50").
31. FM 24-1, p. 3-7.
32. Ibid., p. 2-10.
33. Ibid.
34. 5TH Signal Command, Organizational Chart.
35. Interview with Alfred J. Mallette, MG, USA, CDR CECOM, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. 22 February 1991.

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Mallette, Alfred J., MG, USA. Personal Interview. Fort Monmouth: 22 February 1991.